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Response
Ivor Agyeman-Duah
Any serious discussion about the global economy is unlikely to occur
in the absence of freedom, democracy, and the operation of the mar-
kets. These have become the primary elements of economic develop-
ment. Also, the transnationalization of any economy and its impact on
the sovereignty and national structures of any country demand these
discussions. This response will focus mainly on the African experience.
Without freedom of speech and freedom to make choices, democ-
racy is difficult to attain. And if democracy becomes difficult to attain,
it affects the very well-being of citizens because it jeopardizes the eco-
nomic structures of the country. The problems of civil wars, the atten-
dant refugee crises, and immigration to Europe and America, as they
occur in Africa and other developing countries, all relate to citizens’
lack of freedom to make choices for democracy to prevail. The United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19) says:
“Everybody has the right of freedom of opinion and expression, this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers.”1 This is more an economic statement than
a political one. And Mr. Mkandawire shares this view.
Information has become the basis of economic growth, capital
export, and how to entice investors, be they transnationals or locals.
Whilst Mkandawire writes at length about leadership betrayal, a situa-
tion that undermines free media and information, he does not closely
examine the role of the media in globalization. Information has
become the world’s window on the status of the market. Today infor-
mation comes from sophisticated sources, in addition to such tradi-
tional sources as newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. It is
easy now to share “inter” and “intra” economic news by means of
these mass media. Consider, for example, that someone in a small
town in Senegal can, within a minute, get information from a small city
in Sweden via the fax machine, satellite hookup, telephone, courier
service, or other resource along what United States Vice President, Al
Gore, dubbed the “Information Super Highway.” The global village of
information has become intimately linked with the global village of the
economy. As a result, I can exchange economic data within seconds via
e-mail or the Internet. I can instantly check the listing on the New York
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Stock Exchange by going to its Website, and I can print business news
from CNN or Time or Newsweek from my computer — all because I am
connected.
Today, a Ghanaian who lives in Alabama or rural Ohio can listen to
a broadcast from a radio talk show in Accra, Ghana, and even con-
tribute to the discussion. We live in an era when economic conferences
can take place on the Internet, eliminating the need for speakers to
travel 4,000 miles and more from Buenos Aires or Melbourne to Cape
Verde. Media technology and its concomitant availability are so
advanced (even in developing nations) that dictatorships find it diffi-
cult to suppress information. During the reign of the late Nigerian dic-
tator, Sani Abacha, it was an offense punishable by imprisonment to
send critical newspaper clippings across the border to Togo or Benin,
Nigeria’s closest neighbors. But by courtesy of the Internet and satellite
dishes, some Nigerians and those outside the country could know
what was happening.
The liberalization of many economies, especially in developing
countries, and the privatization of state-owned media ensure that peo-
ple have alternative sources of information. But, like all ideas capitalis-
tic, the freedom to be connected to the Internet, to read data on stock
exchanges and to contact brokers, to access satellite television, and to
subscribe to M-Net and other broadcasting agencies are expensive.
And poor, undemocratic countries lack the opportunity to avail them-
selves of these facilities and the freedom that can facilitate economic
growth. (Africa has about 12 percent of the world’s population but
only 2 percent of world media.) Fortunately, in some African coun-
tries, including Ghana, Senegal, Botswana, and South Africa, where
there are relatively stable governments and relatively better democra-
cies, the limited media technologies are helping to facilitate economic
growth. But this is clearly not the case in places like Sierra Leone,
Ethiopia, Eritrea, or Mozambique, where coups are frequent and gov-
ernance is volatile But because freedom and democracy in economic
development are becoming inevitable everywhere, Africa also has
something to prove. A June 1998 World Bank news report on Africa
says that nine sub-Saharan African countries have privatized their
state-run telephone companies, which represent 75 percent of all tele-
phones, a move beneficial to transnationals. According to the report,
this change, among others, has generated nearly $2 billion in govern-
ment revenues and another $4 to $6 billion in investment commit-
ments over the next five to seven years.2
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In an essay published in the fall of 1996 and titled “Screening Out
the Flies,” Larry Campbell reveals that there are more than 100,000
Internet users in Singapore, an island nation of three million people.
The government disapproves and attempts to control its usage by
claiming the Internet broadcasts pornography. The same impressive
figure for Internet usage is recorded in China. The governments of
these two Asian countries are traditionally wary of freedom and
democracy, and quick to ban what is deemed unsuitable. That they
seek to control freedom of information rather than ban it altogether is
because they recognize the usefulness of media technology in promot-
ing economic growth. It is expected that, for both developed and
developing economies, the irresistible freedom and democracy that the
new media technology offers cannot be separated from economic
development. The concluding point of Campbell’s article holds true
for Africa, too: “We are certainly aware that the Chinese authorities are
looking to restrict access, but we are confident that technology will
move quicker than the Chinese government. I don’t believe they have
the resources or the knowledge to control what goes on in cyber-
space.”3
*****
Trade between Africa or the developing world of the South and the
industrialized countries of the North has never been balanced. The
industrialized countries of the North and, more especially, the Group
of Seven have engaged in international trade with the South for cen-
turies. Just as the North, or industrialized world, dominates the “infor-
mation order” (controlling more than 80 percent of world information
or media), so too does it dominate the economic order. The South pro-
duces raw materials for the industrialized world to turn into finished
goods. Prices of these raw materials are dictated by the industrialized
world, which also dictates the price of their finished goods. This trade
imbalance partly accounts for the South’s underdevelopment and its
debt to the North. This imbalance is of international concern. South-
South cooperation (the encouragement of international trade within
the developing world of Africa, Asia, Latin America, etc.) became a
fashionable hope in the late 1970s not only to establish fair practices
pertaining to inter-African and intra-African trade but also to consoli-
date regional groupings, which emerged in Africa and Asia in the
1960s. The Organization of African Unity, formed in 1960 in Addis
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Ababa, Ethiopia, was the first such regional group; by 1990, forty-nine
African states, with a total population of 465 million, had regrouped
themselves in subregional economic communities. In West Africa,
there are the West African Economic Community (1973), the Mano
River Union (1974), and the Economic Community of West African
States (1975). In North Africa, there is the Arab Maghreb Union (1989);
in Central Africa, the Customs and Economic Community of the Great
Lakes Countries (1976); and in Eastern and Southern Africa are the
Southern Africa Customs Union (1910) and the Southern Africa Devel-
opment Coordination Conference (1980). These unions and others
want strong economies for their countries and regions. Apart from
these union creations, many declarations, hopes, and promises have
been made to achieve this goal: the Lagos Plan of Action, Final Act of
Lagos, Africa’s Declaration on Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (1973), Africa’s Priority Program of Economic Recovery (1985),
Africa’s Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly on Africa’s Economic and Social Crisis (1986), the
United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and
Development (1986 – 90), and many more. Indeed, if regional group-
ings, declarations, and promises alone could save Africa’s economic
position, I think the aim would have been reached. Professor S.K.B.
Asante asserts in a World Bank Report: “Economically, African states
include a high proportion of the world’s least developed countries; in
1991, the World Bank reckoned the poorest of all as Mozambique with
a GNP per capita of a mere U.S. 80 dollars while of the 32 countries in
the world with per capita income of less than 500 U.S. dollars, no fewer
than 21 were to be found in sub-Saharan Africa.”4 Such depressing sta-
tistics account for why many people reasonably think that developing
regional groups with the aim of building strong economies could help
Africa. After all, even Europe in the 1950s and 1960s saw the need to
integrate in the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the Euro-
pean Economic Community (1957), and the now-famous European
Union (EU), organized in the 1990s.
The question is: How feasible are some of these attempts at uniting
the economies of Africa in the face of transnational operations? The lat-
ter include, for example, the transfer of huge amounts of capital to
Africa (but sometimes transferring it from Africa); skills and setting up,
in some cases, the economic agendas of countries; and dictating how
sovereign countries should conduct their business. Because unstable
governments breed unstable economies in Africa, with resultant
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poverty, the International Monetary Fund/World Bank brought Struc-
tural Adjustment Programs to the continent, despite protests from
trade unions and students. Today, almost all countries in West Africa
and beyond are on IMF/World Bank prescriptions, which encourage
liberalization of the economy and deregulation. Transnational compa-
nies flourish in this atmosphere due to “access to international know-
how, management techniques and capital as well as technology.”
Attempts to redeem Africa’s regional groupings and United Nations
declarations notwithstanding, it is the presence of transnationals that
makes the greater impact, for good or bad.
How exactly do transnational companies affect the sovereignty of
Africa? Obviously, Africa needs external support in the form of capital
transfer. All countries, as they are being developed, need it. Think, for
instance, of the Marshall Plan following World War II and the hun-
dreds of millions of dollars that were given to the countries of Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the death of communism in
the late 1980s.
*****
Many Pan-African institutions (like the Pan-African News Agency in
Dakar, Senegal, set up in the 1970s to report about Africa from the
African perspective) are currently selling huge shares to non-Africans.
The insistence that only African capital, insufficient in any case, should
be accepted to run this agency almost led to its collapse. The same
thing happened to the African Development Bank (ADB) in the Ivory
Coast, which was seen as an African bank, with very limited capital
from non-African institutions and persons; today, however, capital
investment in the bank is 40 percent non-African and 60 percent
African. At the bank’s 1998 board of directors meeting in Abidjan, non-
African institutions clamored for more shares, indicating a strong pos-
sibility of African institutions taking an even lower percentage than
non-Africans in the future. These two examples reveal how Pan-
African sovereignty has withered in the face of transnational aggres-
sion.
Furthermore, there is the general consensus that, in the words of Dr.
Douglas Zormelo, “their [transnational companies] ability to affect
governments stems from several factors including their potential abil-
ity to undermine the policy prerogatives of governments by virtue of
their methods of transferring finance and their overwhelming eco-
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nomic strengths. It is, therefore, their ability to circumvent tax laws
and undermine monetary and fiscal policy that concerns govern-
ment.”5 And because they are motivated mainly by profit, they don’t
often invest in areas of long-term profit. Instead, as Mkandawire
rightly says: “Much of the foreign investment has gone into mining
activities (especially oil and gold) and in a few countries; little of this
has gone into manufacturing industry and the little that has, has been
driven not by plans to set up new productive enterprises but to buy up
existing ones that are being sold under fire-sale privatization condi-
tions.”6 Despite what Mkandawire and Zormelo correctly contend,
some government officials aid certain transnational companies in
Africa by collaborating with them to dupe their own countries. In
Ghana, for example, strong allegations have been made in the media
against some government officials of collaborating with transnational
companies, especially from Malaysia, that buy state companies
cheaply under divestiture in which these officials are shareholders.
There are many Malaysians and other investors in Ghanaian media,
hotel, and other businesses who have partners in government and who
may help companies subvert tax and other obligations to the state.
Laws like the Industrial Relations Act, 1965 (Act 299) and the Labor
Decree, 1967, exist to check the excesses of transnational corporations
that do not have government officials as partners. But how effective
are they? For example, no proper account was rendered to the people
of Ghana when the government sold more than 30 percent of its share
of Ashanti Goldfields, one of the richest such resources in the world, to
Lohoro. Though some Ghanaian economists — led by a former gover-
nor of the Bank of Uganda, Dr. Jones Ofori Atta—took the sale to court
for rape of the national economy, the judiciary, whose independence
cannot be assured, issued no ruling of consequence.
Another dubious form of collaboration is that of governments and
political parties working together to cheat host countries by way of
funding party activities and other sponsorships. Again, remember
Nigeria in 1995, when Shell International collaborated with the gov-
ernment of the late General Sani Abacha to kill Ken Saro Wiwa and
eight other human-rights activists of the Ogoniland in eastern Nigeria.
Not only did Shell support the Abacha government in hanging people
who had legitimately complained about Shell’s destruction of their
environment, but it also looked on with impunity as the international
community declared the jury illegal. Thus, Shell International, while
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creating employment opportunities in Nigeria, had more power and
influence under the government of Sani Abacha than some Nigerians.
*****
Mkandawire concludes his essay by saying, “We need to place on the
agenda some of the key concerns of nationalist politics — equity,
nation-building, sovereignty. And we need a much more creative insti-
tutional design to respond to the peculiarities of Africa’s social plural-
ism.”7 This is perfectly true, especially for those of us who cherish
communalism and communal sharing in African culture. But one can
also argue that, in many cases, transnationals can take away the sover-
eignty of a people or a state, not simply by themselves but in concert
with people in local government. Since these transnationals gain more
profit by collaborating with corrupt governments and officials, gov-
ernments must be more nationalistic to avoid the erosion of sovereign
status. Host government officials should make sure they don’t sell
state enterprises to transnationals for the infamous 10 percent cut. And
they should make sure state properties are given to citizens who can
afford to buy. Finally, they should prevent activities, like tax evasion,
that are bad for the state.
Transnational companies are not philanthropic organizations,
although they do provide employment and sometimes training for
local personnel; in these ways, the operations can be positive. Some
transnationals, including banks and media institutions like AT&T and
M-Net, have granted scholarships and sponsored sporting events and
other forms of entertainment, even if the costs of which are but a frac-
tion of the huge profits the companies transfer back to their own coun-
tries. And some, like M-Net, which are controlled by non-Africans, set
agendas and standards in culture that barely reflect African values. It
is safe to say, then, that African governments need transnationals to
improve their economies, just as transnationals need bases to operate
their businesses. Economic liberalization has come to stay in the
absence of a rival, and transnationals will swim in its glory.
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